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ABSTRACT 
When implementing a system of sensors, one of the biggest challenges is to 
establish a threshold at which a signal is generated. All signals that exceed this detection 
threshold are then investigated to determine whether the signal was due to an “event of 
interest,” or whether the signal is due simply to noise. Below the threshold all signals are 
ignored.  
We develop a mathematical model for setting individual sensor thresholds to 
obtain optimal probability of detecting a significant event, given a limit on the total 
number of false positives allowed in any given time period.  
A large number of false signals can consume an excessive amount of resources 
and could undermine confidence in the system’s credibility. One motivation for this 
problem is that it allows decision makers to explicitly optimize system detection 
performance while ensuring it meets organizational resource constraints.  
Our simulations demonstrate the methodology’s performance for various sizes of 
sensor networks, from ten up to thousands of sensors. Such systems apply to a wide 
variety of homeland security and national defense problems, from biosurveillance to 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Statistical process control (SPC) has been used for monitoring and quality control 
in manufacturing since its pioneer Walter Shewhart first implemented the control chart 
that bears his name. Throughout the last eighty-plus years SPC has evolved greatly 
through the development of other monitoring tools such as cumulative sum (CUSUM) 
and exponentially weighted moving average (EWMA) charts that take past data into 
account. Importantly, the use of SPC techniques has spread to non-manufacturing 
disciplines, which recognize the benefits of SPC practices for monitoring processes in 
various fields.  
A constant theme throughout the literature of SPC and detection theory is the 
balancing of the probabilities of detection and false alarm. Because the impact of each of 
these events is very disparate, and varies with each application, there is no consensus on 
exactly how this should be done.  
It would be easy to maximize the probability of detection when there are 
unlimited resources to investigate signals for validity. In reality, however, there are 
always constraints on resources. As such, we must find a good balance between our 
chances of detection and false alarms. Thus, we learn that we can set our detection 
threshold low enough so that we have a good opportunity of detecting a true signal from 
the underlying noise, without exceeding the constraints on our investigative capability. 
How to find this point is challenging, however, when we have many sensors working 
simultaneously to sift through potentially massive amounts of data.  
The motivation for this study is the proliferation of biological surveillance 
systems that have been implemented since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, 
and the anthrax-laced letters received in government offices in the months that followed. 
Such systems, which monitor health care data for early indications of man-made or 
naturally occurring disease epidemics, must constantly balance the inherent trade-off that 
arises between sensitivity, signal timeliness, and rate of false alarms (specificity), when 
setting detection thresholds.  
 xiv
Our methodology assigns probabilities of experiencing some “event of interest” to 
individual sensor coverage areas. In practice these probabilities can be derived from any 
data that is available, including actual expected probability based on intelligence, or some 
feature of the area such as population, volume of traffic or commerce, or land or sea area.  
Given these prior probabilities of an event of interest, manifesting itself as a shift 
in the mean of the "no event" distribution, we use mathematical nonlinear programming 
techniques to determine appropriate individual thresholds to maximize the probability of 
detecting an event of given magnitude, subject to a constraint on the expected number of 
false alarms per time period. In fact, this methodology can be applied to any multi-sensor 
data-monitoring problem where we are interested in assessing if a shift in the underlying 
distribution has occurred in one or more of the sensors, without exceeding investigative 
resources. 
In the biosurveillance context, it has often been assumed by policymakers, that 
adding more sensors provides a better chance of detecting a manmade or naturally 
occurring epidemic. Using this technique for models of various numbers of sensors, we 
examine the performance implications of policy alternatives. All of this work was done 
with Microsoft Excel, one of the most widely available analytical tools in use today.  
One lesson we demonstrate is that adding marginal sensors to an existing system 
of sensors, while keeping the expected rate of false alarms constant, lowers the system-
wide probability of detection and detracts from the probabilities of detection for each of 
the existing sensors. The only way to add sensors without diminishing overall detection 
performance is to allow for more false alarms.  
We first apply our method to the two hundred most-populous counties in the 
United States, using population as a proxy for probability of experiencing a major 
biological event of interest, which would manifest itself in data as an increased number of 
patients seeking treatment. We provide an analysis of our method’s false alarm-
constrained detection performance, showing that the most-populous counties (or those 
assigned the largest probability weight, in the general sense) receive the lowest 
thresholds. We assume that this result is desirable, as those areas with the highest 
 xv
probability of event will also have the highest probability of detecting it, although with 
the highest probability of false alarm as well. We then compare the results of similar 
models using the same population data and resource constraints to evaluate the 
performance of systems consisting of various numbers of county-based sensors. We find 
that while holding the acceptable number of false alarms at a constant, individual sensor 
and system-wide detection performance improves for systems with less sensor coverage, 
as investigative resources are not spread so thin.  
We perform several excursions meant to simulate implementation of various 
policies. The first is a mandate to shift all detection thresholds down by the same given 
percentage. This approach might be done in an effort to improve detection performance 
system-wide. As the thresholds are lowered, the detection performance rises although at a 
decreasing rate, and the number of false alarms rises at an increasing rate. We find that 
small percentage decreases in all thresholds (less than five to ten percent) result in modest 
nonlinear percentage increases in detection performance (again, less than ten percent). 
However, we also find that caution is warranted in following such an approach because 
the cost of false alarms can quickly outstrip the benefits of improved detection.  
We also explore the possibility of allowing each sensor to vary its threshold 
according to local policy. This could be due to the availability of (or lack of) local 
investigative resources. Through a simulation of random perturbations about each 
sensor’s optimal threshold, we find that there is negligible benefit from this policy in 
terms of detection probability, and a major cost in terms of false alarms. As the amount of 
allowed variability at each sensor increases, the number of false alarms increases at a 
rapid rate. We conclude that dispersal of control over detection thresholds is not a good 
policy unless very tight controls on the bounds of such movement are implemented.  
Next, we adapt a tool of health care surveillance implemented several times in the 
last few years. Drop-in surveillance has been used to monitor populations near major 
events such as the Super Bowl and major political conventions. Looking at Denver 
County, Colorado, host of this year’s Democratic National Convention, we examine what 
happens when we force a particular sensor’s detection threshold to be lower than its 
optimal value in order to improve detection performance in a given area. Performing a 
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sensitivity analysis, we demonstrate that it is possible to dramatically improve detection 
performance in a single sensor area without significantly degrading overall system 
performance. We note that although it is possible to tailor constraints to achieve certain 
collateral goals (those that are separate from the overall goal of maximizing system-wide 
probability of detection), we must be careful not to over-constrain the optimization 
system. Doing so will severely degrade the optimal solution and defeats the purpose of 
using these techniques. 
Finally, taking advantage of some properties derived from our statistical 
assumptions, we derive a single-variable analytical solution that allows us to solve 
problems of virtually unlimited size. We use this solution to present results from a system 
of sensors covering all 3,141 counties in the United States (see Figure E1 below). We 
find that scaling up from 200 to 3,141 counties results in a small decrease in overall 
probability of detection, lower detection thresholds (with correspondingly higher 
probabilities of detection) for a small handful of the largest counties, and higher 
thresholds (resulting in lower probabilities of detection) for the remaining smaller 
counties. In a system of this size, we realize that the very large number of small counties, 
in relation to the handful of largest counties, results in well over one thousand sensors 
with no probability of detection of the given distributional shift. This large-scale model 
should provide some insight to biosurveillance policymakers as to the reasonable limits 
of system expansion.  
 xvii
 
Figure E1: Output from optimizing 3,141 counties 
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I. SURVEILLANCE AND STATISTICAL PROCESS CONTROL 
A.  INTRODUCTION  
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the anthrax-laced 
letters received in government offices in the months that followed, the federal 
government, along with state and local public health departments nationwide, has 
installed biological surveillance systems across the country to provide the earliest 
possible indication that a bio-terror attack is underway. Such systems, which monitor 
health care data for signs of man-made or naturally occurring disease epidemics, must 
constantly balance the inherent trade-off that arises between sensitivity, reporting 
timeliness, and rate of false alarms (specificity), when setting detection thresholds. These 
detection thresholds are simply the signal intensity or magnitude above which an alarm is 
generated to notify of an abnormal condition.  
The problem of optimizing a system consisting of multiple threshold detection 
sensors, in terms of setting individual sensor thresholds to maximize the probability of 
detecting an event of interest, in the form of a shift in the underlying distribution, has not 
been solved. We turn to the industrial engineering field for tools to help us maximize the 
probability of detection of an event of a given magnitude, while limiting the false alarm 
rate to some manageable level. In this thesis, we develop a model using nonlinear 
mathematical programming techniques to determine appropriate individual thresholds at 
each location in a distributed set of sensors, taking into account the likelihood of some 
event of interest in each sensor’s coverage area, and accounting explicitly for constraints 
on resources available for investigation of false positives.  
B. STATISTICAL PROCESS CONTROL 
With the expanding use of mass machine production in the early twentieth 
century, techniques were needed to ensure the quality of the items produced without 
conducting inspections on every single item. In the 1920’s, Dr. Walter A. Shewhart of 
Bell Telephone Laboratories pioneered statistical process control (SPC) through his 
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development of the control chart that bears his name. In effect, these control charts are 
sensors that provide a signal when the monitored parameter exceeds a particular threshold 
value.  
In recent years, the use of statistical process control techniques has expanded to 
other, non-manufacturing applications. MacCarthy and Wasusri (2001) and Montgomery 
(2001) each cite an extensive list of SPC applications outside the manufacturing industry, 
from monitoring and evaluating to planning and forecasting. Some areas of study include 
water quality and chemical monitoring, predictive and preventative maintenance, 
customer service and satisfaction, trends in patient mortality, crime rates, and food 
industry hygiene.  
In the manufacturing sector, the monitored process has a desired state, for 
example achieving components with particular measurements. In contrast, many non-
manufacturing processes have objectives and measurements that must be defined by the 
user. The sensors might also be tasked to monitor similar processes in many locations at 
once. In this case, using the same detection threshold in all locations might not be a good 
solution because the data in each location may come from distributions with different 
statistical properties, or have different performance or levels of importance.  
In manufacturing, there is always some amount of natural variability that cannot 
be avoided. Each item that comes off an automated assembly line must be within some 
tolerance of a target value, even if it is that value is not exactly satisfied. With only these 
“chance” causes of variation present, a process is said to be in statistical control. When 
some factor external to the process is introduced, such as a defect in material, operator 
error, or an inadvertent or incorrect adjustment to a machine, these “assignable causes” 
place the system in a state known as out of control. (Montgomery, 2000) Once the 
process goes out of control, manufacturing must be stopped and the cause investigated 
and corrected. SPC aims to detect as early as possible any assignable causes in order to 
minimize the costs of producing defective items.  
The Shewhart chart is a relatively simple tool used for monitoring a process. An 
example is shown in Figure 1. The observations that are plotted are the measurements of 
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individual samples taken from the production line. The desired value of the process in 
this chart, e.g. the diameter of a circular object such as a washer, or the length of a bolt, is 
5.00 units. The lines at 3.00 and 7.00 are the lower control limit (LCL) and the upper 
control limit (UCL), respectively; these are the extreme values of the distributional 
parameter being monitored (often the meanµ ) that are permissible. While the process is 
in control, nearly all samples taken will have measured values within the control limits; 
these limits are specified so that the items produced in the process are highly likely to be 
within specification limits so long as the process is in control. Beyond these specification 
limit values, the items are not acceptable because they are either too big or too small. 
Warning limits are often added as well, placed between the target value and the control 
limits, to indicate that the process might be drifting toward one of its control limits, and 
that some action should be taken to prevent production of defective material. If the 
process is in control, a random pattern should appear on the control chart.  
 
Figure 1: In-control Shewhart chart.  
Process meanµ = 5 ,σ = 1 ; control limits set at + −2σ . 
 
The upper and lower control limits can be chosen to be particular values, such as 
+ −  0.1 millimeters from the target value, or they can be given in terms of a number k of 
standard deviations, + − kσ .  
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The most common Shewhart chart is the x  (x-bar) chart, which is used to monitor 
the mean of the in-control distribution.  This form of the Shewhart chart assumes that 
samples are taken at some regular interval, and that the sample mean x  is normally 
distributed by the central limit theorem. (Montgomery, 2000) However, the Shewhart 
chart is not restricted to monitoring production statistics that are normally distributed. 
Rather, the main idea of the Shewhart chart is to monitor when observations fall far out in 
the tail of the statistic’s distribution. This idea can be applied to any distribution so long 
as the distribution can be specified and the control limits can be calculated as the 
appropriate quantiles of the distribution. Stoumbos and Reynolds (2000) provide analysis 
of the performance of Shewhart control charts against several heavy-tailed symmetric and 
asymmetric distributions. They demonstrate that a Shewhart chart with control limits 
+ − kσ  based on the normal distribution will detect shifts of other distributions, although 
with higher false alarm rates as evidenced by shorter average times to signal (ATS), due 
to the higher densities in the tail regions of non-normal distributions.  
The Shewhart control chart in Figure 1 represents a normally distributed process 
with 100 observations drawn from a normal distribution. The process has a mean 
µ = 5.00  and standard deviation σ = 1 , with 2σ  control limits. All observations fall 
between these control limits, so this process is in-control. Figure 2 is another Shewhart 
control chart using exactly the same observations, but with an upward shift in the 
distribution mean by 0.5σ  for all observations starting at observation #40. As it turns 
out, this observation’s value of 7.33 exceeds the control limit value (“threshold”) of 7.00. 
At this point, the process should be stopped and investigated to find out whether there has 
been a change in the underlying distribution.  
 5
 
Figure 2: Out-of-control Shewhart chart. 
+0.5σ  shift in process mean occurs at observation #40. 
 
It should be noted that in the industrial quality control literature there is a great 
amount of discussion on efficient means of sampling an industrial process. While larger 
samples and those taken at more frequent intervals are generally more representative of 
the product being produced, the process of sampling itself, as well as the possibly 
destructive testing, each has its costs. There are, however, individuals control charts that 
directly plot individual measurements of every item produced instead of taking samples. 
These are used when it is not feasible to have a sample size larger than n = 1 . Individual 
measurements are discussed in Montgomery (2001) and Smith (1998). For our purposes, 
and motivated by the biosurveillance problem we will discuss in Chapter III, we will 
assume that each item of data is being plotted on an individuals Shewhart chart, and not a 
sample mean from a multi-unit sample.  
Statistical process control methods have evolved greatly since the introduction of 
the Shewhart chart.  The cumulative sum chart (CUSUM) uses accumulated deviance 
from the target value over time to indicate departure from the in-control condition. In a 
similar manner, the exponentially weighted moving average chart (EWMA) accumulates 
evidence from historical observations, assigning greater weight to more recent 
observations. Because our study will rely on a method based on the Shewhart control 
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chart, details on the CUSUM and EWMA are not included here. See Box and Luceño 
(1997), Montgomery (2001), and Stoumbos and Reynolds (2000) for more details.  
C. PREVIOUS STUDIES OF SPC IN NON-INDUSTRIAL SETTINGS 
There have been several studies in recent years that attempt to use SPC techniques 
to monitor data in settings outside of the manufacturing industry. Montgomery (2001) 
points out that once we get past the idea of not having precise specification limits, we can 
apply SPC techniques to any process where we can take measurements that demonstrate 
quality or performance. A brief summary of several of these non-industrial applications 
of SPC follows.  
Montgomery (2001) cites the use of sampling and testing using control charts by 
the finance division of a company to reduce the flow time of checks through the division, 
thereby reducing the percentage of invoices paid late and resulting in substantial savings 
to the company. Bamford and Greatbanks (2005) examine the use of basic quality tools 
for data collection, display, and statistical analysis for several routine processes that occur 
regularly in everyday life, such as time spent waiting for and receiving services or 
completing various tasks.  
Gordon and Pollack (1994) developed a non-parametric statistical system using 
individual observations to detect departures from a symmetric distribution centered on 
zero, similar to the conditions in our study. They set a constraint on the false alarm rate 
for the single sensor by fixing the same average run length for each simulation. The 
model achieves performance comparable to a standard CUSUM for relatively longer runs 
from simulation start to the shift.  
Most uses of SPC in health care surveillance have used variations on CUSUM 
control charts because of this tool’s ability to detect small deviations over time. Statistical 
process control is well suited to use in manufacturing because while a system is in 
control, variability is caused only by random sources. In comparison, even in-control 
processes in health care monitoring experience non-random sources of variation known 
as overdispersion. Overdispersion occurs when the variability in the data exceeds that 
predicted by using an implicit relationship between the mean and the variance. (Hinde 
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and Dimétrio, 1998) This could be due to a multitude of factors that often cannot be 
controlled and may be difficult to account for in statistical models. This additional 
variability must be either modeled and removed or taken into consideration when setting 
detection thresholds in order to prevent excessive false alarm rates.  
There have been many studies that have imposed simulated disease outbreaks 
overlaid on top of actual in-control health care data to test various detection algorithms. 
Mohtashemi, et al. (2006) used a Shewhart method to detect simulated outbreaks of 
influenza using the mean disease incidence level and a 2σ  detection threshold, with a 
false-alarm rate constrained to be 3.3 percent annually. Fricker (2007a) converts existing 
multivariate methods into directionally sensitive univariate Shewhart and modified 
CUSUM methods, and successfully tests them against multivariate data. Olson, et al. 
(2005) considered the spatial distribution of emergency room patients with respiratory 
symptoms to detect clusters of disease outbreak.  
Woodall (2006) weighs the advantages and disadvantages of the use of control 
charts in health care surveillance, and discusses some specific issues and techniques 
found by public health officials in their implementations that can be adapted by 
traditional SPC users in industry. Woodall concedes that the problem of overdispersion 
might only be solved by increasing control limit widths to reduce false alarm rates.  
Aylin et al. (2003) apply a CUSUM control chart model to monitor deaths of 
patients under the care of primary care physicians in England. They attempt to estimate 
overdispersion in the healthcare practices they examined by using data from other 
practices that were assumed to be in-control. They point out a general lack of models that 
monitor multiple data sources over time. Marshall et al. (2004) uses a CUSUM for 
prospective monitoring of deaths of all types in England in district general hospitals. 
They also handle the issue of overdispersion, as well as attempting to handle multiple 
testing over time by controlling false alarm rate. Both studies use the framework of a shift 
of k standard deviations from a standard normal in-control distribution similar to the 
models in this thesis.  
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The Marshall model differs, however, from the models presented in this thesis in 
that all “sensors” in the system have their thresholds h set at an equal number of standard 
deviations from the in-control distribution, with h ∈{2σ , 3σ , 4σ} . Marshall examines 
the percentages of sensors that signal true detections and false alarms for all 
combinations of distributional shifts kσ  (a CUSUM parameter) and h and for various 
numbers of sensors that have experienced actual shifts in the mean. In contrast, our model 
determines appropriate individual thresholds hi for each sensor i to achieve a maximum 
overall probability of detection of an actual distributional shift, while limiting the 
probability of false alarm to a specified overall rate.  
In their discussion of issues related to statistical epidemiologic surveillance, 
Wilson et al. (2006) weigh in on a specific trade-off that is inherent in any type of 
statistical monitoring, that of limiting type I and type II errors. (A type I error is a false 
alarm, or saying a distributional shift has occurred when none has; a type II error is a 
missed detection, or saying that no shift in the underlying distribution has occurred when 
in fact it has.) They conclude that while excessive false alarms may reduce readiness in 
the health community, the general method of setting limits on false alarms is 
inappropriate in this context because it increases the probability of missing an actual 
event (type II error) where lives would be lost and time wasted. Similarly, Washburn 
(2002) points out that in many sensor applications, the costs associated with false alarms 
and missed detections are so disparate that it is impractical to quantify both on the same 
scale.  
D. ISSUES INVOLVED IN USE OF SPC TECHNIQUES IN NON-
INDUSTRIAL APPLICATIONS 
Because SPC techniques are concerned with identifying increases in the incidence 
of events in the presence of underlying noise, as well as for making an explicit trade-off 
between false signals and missed detections, they have broad applicability in many 
surveillance applications.  
In a threshold detection sensor system, we are interested in sifting through the 
background noise of naturally-occurring incidents to identify a relatively small increase 
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in the number of cases above the background noise, which indicates a shift in the 
underlying distribution, while limiting type I and type II errors.  
A major issue with statistical monitoring is systematic effects. The parameter 
being monitored can change over time, often due to factors that are not of interest to the 
model. Reis et al. (2003), Fricker et al. (2007a), and Fricker et al. (2007b) discuss 
statistical models that eliminate systematic components of the data, such as day-of-week 
and seasonal effects. This idea will be discussed further in Chapter II as we develop our 
model.  
The design of control charts has evolved to include economic factors, since 
reducing the cost of manufacturing is a key objective of SPC. Some of these factors in the 
industrial sector are sampling costs, losses from producing sub-standard product, and the 
costs incurred from investigating false alarms. (Montgomery, 2000) In non-industrial 
applications of SPC, these factors are often not an issue because all data points must be 
examined in order to have sufficient coverage. Determining the sample size and 
frequency at which we sample is therefore not a concern. Because we are looking for an 
event of small magnitude, with the goal of quick detection, and because data in many 
applications are collected automatically from an electronic source, every data point and 
every interval of time is considered. These are then analyzed using individuals control 
charts, discussed in Montgomery (2001).  
Finally, we should consider the type of control chart that is appropriate for the 
particular surveillance application. In some applications of SPC, any deviation—whether 
positive or negative—from the desired target level is considered an event of interest. In 
such a case, both directions should be monitored, using either a two-sided control chart or 
two one-sided control charts.  In other applications, such as the biosurveillance problem 
discussed in Chapter III, only changes in one direction are of interest and thus the 
application of a single one-sided control chart will provide greater statistical power. For 
example, assume a Shewhart chart with an in-control distribution that is a standard 
normal ~ (0,1)X N  distribution, and a constraint on probability of false alarm set at five 
percent. For a two-sided test, the right- and left-hand tail areas will each have an area of 
 10
2.5 percent, resulting in z values of + − 1.96. Following a shift in the distribution mean 
of magnitude δ = 1, the area to the left of +1.96 on the resulting normal distribution 
~ (1,1)X N  will be 0.831. The area to the right of this threshold corresponds to the 
probability of detection, Pd = 1− 0.831= 0.169 . If the test is one-sided, the right-hand tail 
will have an area of five percent and a z value of +1.64; the area to the right of +1.64 is 
0.739. With the same shift in the distribution mean, the probability of detection will be 
Pd = 1− 0.739 = 0.261. Table 1 demonstrates probabilities of detection for shifts of 
magnitude δ ∈{1σ , 2σ , 3σ}  for both one- and two-sided hypothesis tests. Clearly when 
we are only interested in detecting an increase in the mean, the one-sided hypothesis test 
performs better.  
Magnitude of Shift Two-Sided Test (Pd) One-Sided Test (Pd) 
δ = 1 0.169 0.261 
δ = 2  0.516 0.641 
δ = 3 0.851 0.913 
Table 1: Comparison of performance for one- and two-sided hypothesis tests. 
Assumes a standard normal ~ (0,1)X N  in-control distribution. 
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II. SURVEILLANCE THROUGH A SYSTEM OF CONTROL 
CHARTS 
A. DESIGNING A SYSTEM OF CONTROL CHARTS 
In industrial SPC, individual univariate control chart applications are designed 
and implemented using one of three approaches. Each of these design approaches is 
concerned not only with setting the detection threshold(s), but also with determining 
sampling frequency and sample size, both of which involve real production costs that 
reduce a commercial organization’s profit. As discussed previously, our use of 
individuals control charts (i.e., control charts that plot every observation individually) 
allows us to ignore that portion of the SPC literature concerned with sampling and issues 
related to minimizing sampling costs.  
The first approach for developing control charts is the statistically designed 
control chart, where the width of the control limit and the power of the test are pre-
selected based on the average time between false signals (referred to as the in-control 
average run length or ARL). For a two-sided Shewhart chart with 3σ  limits, where the 
statistic is normally distributed, there is a 0.0027 probability of committing a type I error 
(signaling that the process is out-of-control when in fact it is in-control). This means that 
99.73 percent of observations taken while the process is in-control will fall between the 
upper and lower control limits and that a false signal will only be generated on average 
once every 370 observations. (Montgomery, 2000) 
A second approach is the economic design of control charts, where thresholds 
along with sampling criteria are chosen in order to minimize the costs associated with 
quality control. These include the costs associated with monitoring production, the cost of 
false alarms, and investigation costs to find the assignable causes when production 
standards are not met.  
A third approach is an economic-statistical design which seeks to minimize lost 
economic costs, while setting an upper limit on the probability of type I error and a lower 
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limit on the power, or probability of detection. Saniga (1989) also sets an upper limit on 
the average time to signal (ATS) for a given shift in the mean.  
Unlike these approaches, here we seek not to design a single control chart, but a 
system of control charts. In so doing we use an essentially statistical approach, both for 
its simplicity, and because determining the costs of type I and type II errors in a 
surveillance setting is non-trivial. However, we note that if such costs are available, the 
optimization model could be modified to account for economic considerations as well. 
The model seeks to explore how to optimally set detection thresholds at each location to 
maximize overall probability of detection of a distributional shift of a specified 
magnitude, subject to constraints on the expected number of false alarms per time period. 
We note that this constraint is an implicit economic constraint, in the sense that false 
alarms must be investigated and such investigations consume resources.  
B. MODELING ASSUMPTIONS  
There are several major assumptions that we rely upon for the development of the 
model in this study. We first lay out the assumptions that abstract the system we are 
looking at, and then relate the mathematical and statistical assumptions used in the 
development and testing of our model.  
The first simplifying assumption we make is that our system of sensors is 
designed, or at least has set its threshold levels, in order to detect increases in the 
background levels of the measure of interest. Several examples were cited in the previous 
chapter where SPC was used to detect deviations from an in-control state, each of which 
was interested in an increase in the distributional mean level of the statistic of interest. 
The previous chapter also discussed the statistical benefit of increased sensitivity that 
results from use of a one-sided control chart.  
Because in this problem we assume that each observation is being monitored, we 
have designed the model around individuals Shewhart charts. Essentially, we are 
assuming that monitoring timeliness is so important that each observation will be 
monitored individually as it arrives.  That is, instead of taking samples from a population, 
or waiting to aggregate a series of individual observations into a combined measurement, 
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we are examining every data point and comparing it to our threshold. Montgomery 
(2001) discusses the use of individuals control charts.  
Another assumption that simplifies the problem for our purposes is that each 
sensor provides complete coverage of its assigned area, without any overlap with 
adjacent sensors. This allows for each sensor to be independent of all other sensors. In the 
real world, however, it will be difficult and perhaps even undesirable to implement a 
system of sensors where there is no overlap in coverage; it is better to have two sensors 
detect an event than to have a possibility that the one sensor where the event occurs will 
miss the event.  
The final simplifying assumption we make is that at most one event (distributional 
shift) occurs per time period within our sensor network. Using Yi as a binary variable to 
indicate the presence or absence of an event in sub-region i, we can express this 




∑ ≤ 1 ; Yi ∈[0,1]      (1) 
Allowing for more than one event per time period complicates study of the central 
problem. The problem as we have laid it out, however, is conservative in its estimate of 
the probability of detection: it will be easier to detect two independent events than just 
one. Looking at the problem of Yi ≤ 1
i
∑  then is a lower bound on the probability of 
detection for one or more events in the region per unit of time.  
Using the law of total probability we briefly consider the mathematics of studying 
multiple events in a single time period. If we have n sub-regions, each with a particular 
probability of experiencing the event in a given time period, the sums of their individual 
probabilities must be one. If we randomly select one sub-region for the first event to 
occur, we must remove that sub-region from consideration for all other events in that 
time period. This gives us a new problem with n −1  sub-regions; all of the probabilities 
of event for these n −1  sub-regions must then be re-normalized to sum to one. This 
process can be repeated for any number of events for any time period. It is easy to see 
that this would best be modeled using simulation to examine the effects of different 
 14
numbers of expected events on our detection and false alarm performance. However, by 
assuming that at most one event occurs per time period, we can look at the probabilities 
of event and the probability of detection as a snapshot rather than as a sequential 
probability game. This greatly simplifies our analysis and its presentation in this thesis. 
The first of the statistical assumptions we make is that the observations we are 
monitoring are independent and identically normally distributed. We justify this 
assumption by assuming that we are monitoring the standardized residuals from a model 
used to account for and remove systematic trends in the data. See Fricker et al. (2007a) 
and Fricker et al. (2007b) for discussion on the use of adaptive regression models to 
remove systematic trends from biosurveillance data, such as day-of-week or seasonal 
effects.  
In addition, we assume that the event of interest will be manifested as a jump 
increase in the mean of the in-control distribution. While this may seem a broadly 
simplifying assumption, in statistical process control the control limits are established at 
values that are the minimum shift that is of interest to the production process. Shifts of 
smaller magnitude are presumably not interesting; conversely, much larger shifts in the 
mean are trivial to detect with a threshold set below the expected shift. For example, 
assume an in-control distribution X ~ N(0,1) , and our control limits set at h = µ + 2σ . 
This will result in a relatively easy detection of a 3σ  increase in the mean, and a 
relatively low probability of detecting a much smaller single standard deviation shift in 
the distribution. These scenarios are depicted in Table 1 in the previous chapter. 
Thus we can represent the out-of-control state as a shift in the mean of the in-
control distribution. In particular, if an observation from the in-control distribution is 
denoted as 2~ (0, )X N σ , then an observation from the out-of-control distribution can be 
denoted as 2' ~ ( , )X N δ σ  where kδ σ=  for some 0k > . Thus, if the in-control 
observations come from a standard normal distribution, an event of magnitude 2σ  results 
in subsequent observations coming from ' ~ (2,1)X N . (Montgomery et al., 2006)  
The Shewhart methodology assumes that samples are independent of one another. 
However, the independence assumption is unrealistic in many applications, where 
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processes generate data that is autocorrelated over time. (Stoumbos and Reynolds, 2000) 
Such temporal change will significantly affect the performance of a Shewhart x  chart; as 
previously described, we have assumed that temporal effects can be accounted for and 
removed from the data using an approach such as adaptive regression prior to 
implementing our model. Adapting our model for temporal methods such as CUSUM and 
EWMA, whose statistics are autocorrelated, is an area for future research.  
C. MODEL OBJECTIVE  
The objective of the model developed in this thesis is to maximize the probability 
of detecting a distributional shift (event) of a certain magnitude within a region, subject 
to a constraint on the expected number of false alarms per unit of time. The region is 
divided into multiple, disjoint sub-regions, each of which is being monitored for an event, 
and each of which has some probability of having the event occur within that sub-region. 
Recall from the previous section our assumptions of independence and full sensor 
coverage.  
While the goal is to “tune” the sensor detection thresholds in each sub-region, 
such that the probability of detecting an event of particular magnitude somewhere in the 
region is maximized, there is a trade-off inherent in setting the detection thresholds, both 
in industrial SPC and in threshold detection applications. As a threshold is lowered 
toward the background noise of the data, the sensor becomes more sensitive to the natural 
variation in the data and is more likely to generate false alarms. As a result, detection 
thresholds must be set as low as possible in order to maximize the probability of 
detection, but not so low that the rate of resulting false positive signals is intolerable. 
Hence, the goal is to develop an optimization framework to determine individual 
thresholds for each sub-region that will maximize the overall probability of detecting an 
event, subject to an upper limit on the expected false alarm rate over the entire region.  
To determine the optimal set of thresholds, we first need to determine the 
probability of an event occurring in each of the sub-regions. These probabilities can be 
determined or estimated in a variety of ways.  The algorithm we use to estimate this 
probability of event is as follows. First, we assign each sub-region a numerical weight. 
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The weights can be any number on any scale, with larger weights indicating a higher 
likelihood of experiencing the event. These individual weights are then normalized by 
dividing each individual weight by the sum of all weights assigned across the region. 
This gives us each sub-region’s proportion of the total weight, and thus its estimated 
probability of experiencing the event. This model is described mathematically in the 
following section.  
D. MODEL FORMULATION 
Assume a region has been divided up into N non-overlapping sub-regions, with 
each sub-region containing one sensor. The output from each sensor i, i = 1,…, n, is 
expressed as Xi. When there is no event of interest, the system is in control, with the Xi’s 
being independent and identically distributed. We express this as 0~itX F  for all i and for 
t = 1, 2, 3, …. If an event of interest occurs at time τ, then for one i 1~itX F  for t τ≥ . 
We are interested in determining a detection threshold hi for each sub-region i to detect 
this distributional shift. A signal is generated at any time t when any sensor output 
itX exceeds its threshold hi.  
Recall that in Chapter I we discussed the rationale for limiting the number of 
events per unit of time to no more than one. Equation (1) expressed this constraint using a 
binary variable Yi . Thus, given some information about each sub-region and each sensor, 
we calculate or estimate the: 
• Probability of an event in sub-region i: Pr(event in sub-region )i ;  
• Probability of detecting an event should one occur in sub-region i: 
Pr(detect | event in sub-region )i ; and 
• Expected number of false alarms in sub-region i per 
period: (false alarms for sub-region )E i . 
Given Pr(detect | event in subregion )i  and Pr(event in subregion )i for each sub-
region, the probability the system detects an event in the whole region is 
 
Pr(detect event on region)= Pr(detect |event in sub-region i) Pr(event in sub-region i)
i=1
n∑  (2) 
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As previously described, we use the weight of a particular sub-region mi as a 
fraction of the total regional weight M = mi
i=1
n∑  as a proxy for the probability of an event 
in that sub-region, with Pr(event in region ) imi
M
= .  
The probability of a false signal in sub-region i for a given threshold hi is thus  
 
 
pi (hi ) = f0(x)dxx=hi
∞∫ = 1− F0 (hi ) ,  (3)  
where f(x) is the pdf of the distribution of the statistic being monitored, under the 
assumption of no event, evaluated at x.  
Using this same notation, the expected number of false alarms in sub-region i per 
time period is (false alarms for sub-region ) 1 ( ) 0 [1 ( )] ( ).i i i i i iE i p h p h p h= × + × − =  
Assuming that the regions are independent, the expected number of false alarms for the 
region per time period is thus 
 
 pi (hi )
i=1
n∑ . 
Assuming that the event of interest manifests itself as a shift in the mean of the 
no-event distribution, so that f1(x) = f0 (x) + δ , δ > 0 , the probability of a true signal can 
be denoted as 
p
i
(hi − δ ) = f1(x) dx
x=hi
∞
∫ = f0 (x)
x=hi −δ
∞
∫ dx = 1− F0 (hi − δ )   (4) 
Given the preceding, we can then express the problem of maximizing the region-wide 
probability of detection subject to a constraint κ( ) on the expected number of false 
signals as a non-linear programming model (NLP), which we will refer to as STOPT 






i  Sub-region within area of interest 
 
Data 
mi  Relative weight assigned to sub-region i κ   Max allowed false alarms in region 
δ   Magnitude of shift in mean incidence level 
 
Variables                (5) 









∑ 1− F0(hi − δ )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
subject to 1− F0(hi )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
i=1
N∑ ≤κ ,
      
Due to the potential for high false alarm rates in sub-regions that have a higher 
probability of detecting an event, one possible variation would be to add a second 
constraint to limit the probability that a given sub-region will experience false alarms. 
Alternatively, we could specify a minimum acceptable probability of detection for a 
particular sensor, by setting a lower bound on the probability of detection. These 
respective constraints take the form of Equations (6) and (7). 
 1− F0(hi ) ≤ αu ; 0 ≤αu ≤ 1    (6) 
 1− F1(hi ) ≥ ρl ; 0 ≤ ρl ≤ 1     (7) 
The inequality in (6) places an upper limit αu  on the probability of signaling a false 
alarm for a particular location, and (7) places a lower limit ρl  on probability of detection 
by a particular sensor. The effect of (6) is to force the thresholds for the constrained sub-
regions to move higher, forcing them away from the underlying noise to lessen the 
probability of false alarm. While this is desirable in terms of reducing resources spent on 
investigating false alarms, the constraint also decreases the probability of detection for 
those sub-regions. Equation (7) does the opposite, pulling thresholds down to increase 
sensitivity, with the trade-off that the probability of false alarm increases.  
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The STOPT model in (5) is designed so that we can control the probability of 
detection and the number of region-wide false alarms by changing the value on the right 
hand side of the constraint. This model has the potential for enhancement by tailoring the 
constraints in (5), (6), and (7) to meet the objectives of the system. Expressed as a 
nonlinear program, and assuming that the in-control distribution at each sensor is 
~ (0,1)iX N  with a shift of magnitude δ  in the mean incidence level, our model 
becomes: 
Indices 
i  Sub-region within area of interest 
 
Data 
mi  Relative weight assigned to sub-region i κ   Max allowed false alarms in region 
δ   Magnitude of shift in mean incidence level 
 
Variables 







mi∑i∑ [1− Φ(hi − δ )]
subject to [1− Φ(hi )]
i
∑ ≤κ  
( )ihΦ  is the standard normal cumulative distribution function (CDF) evaluated at 
the threshold ih . So the term 1 ( )ih−Φ  in the constraint is the area to the right of the 
detection threshold hi, representing the probability of committing a type I error.  
( )ih δΦ −  is the standard normal CDF evaluated on the out-of-control 
distribution, which in the case of our models is simply the in-control distribution 
 Xi ~ N (0,1)  shifted rightward by some number of sample standard deviations kσ = δ , 
with a resulting distribution of  Xi ' ~ N (δ ,1) . So the term 1 ( )ih δ−Φ −  is the area to the 
right of the detection threshold hi, representing the probability of detecting an actual 
event.  
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Because both our objective function and constraint are nonlinear, we need to 
determine whether a globally optimal solution exists. It is possible in nonlinear 
programming problems for solver algorithms to converge to a point that is locally 
optimal, despite the fact that at other areas on the function or space of interest there are 
areas where we can do much better.  
It is relatively easy to demonstrate that the objective function in (5) is strongly 
quasiconvex over the constraint regions, which in a minimization problem would give a 
globally optimal solution. Unfortunately, because this is a maximization problem, a 
globally optimal solution is not guaranteed on the basis of quasiconvexity of the objective 
function alone. (Bazaraa et al., 1993) However, under the previously specified 
assumptions, and as described in Fricker and Banschbach (2008), a globally optimal 
solution does exist.  
Overall the results from testing of the model in (5) show us that areas assigned a 
higher probability of event will have thresholds set closer to the mean incidence level to 
achieve higher probabilities of detection, with accompanying higher probabilities of false 
alarm; areas with lower assigned probabilities of event will have higher thresholds to 
keep false alarm rates low, with lower probabilities of detection. The overall expected 
number of false alarms system-wide must still be no greater than some level κ  that is 
specified as reasonable. We discuss detailed results in the following chapter. 
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III. SETTING OPTIMAL THRESHOLDS 
A. TOOLS FOR DESIGNING, TESTING, AND IMPLEMENTING MODELS 
The models in this thesis were implemented in Microsoft Excel, using Frontline’s 
Premium Solver (student version) to solve the nonlinear optimization problems. The main 
advantages of Excel are its familiarity to many users, and the ease with which model 
inputs can be changed and the effects of the change recognized immediately. The 
Premium Solver uses the Generalized Reduced Gradient (GRG2) nonlinear optimization 
algorithm, described in Lasdon, et al. (1978)  
Excel’s solver, however, limited the size of problem that could be examined. 
Because our problem is nonlinear, there is a limit of 200 variables over which this 
nonlinear solver can optimize. Problems with more variables can be solved using more 
advanced versions of Frontline’s Premium Solver or a more powerful optimization 
package such as the General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS). Appendix A contains 
GAMS code for a small sample problem that can be expanded to larger models.  
The remaining sections of this chapter seek to apply our algorithm to the intended 
problem of biosurveillance through the use of various examples and excursions. We 
conclude with Section E, which describes a model that takes advantage of the normality 
assumption to reduce the n-variable optimization problem to a one-variable optimization. 
The model is derived in Appendix B and described in Fricker and Banschbach (2008), 
and is limited only by the dimensions of the Excel spreadsheet. 
B. A PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF A THRESHOLD-BASED 
DETECTION SYSTEM TO EPIDEMIOLOGICAL SURVEILLANCE 
The problem that motivated this thesis is that of improving the performance of 
epidemiological surveillance systems, sometimes also called syndromic surveillance. (A 
syndrome is a grouping of diseases, each of which presents similar symptoms. See 
Fricker (2007b) for a detailed overview of syndromic surveillance.) Such public health 
monitoring systems have operated at the federal, state, and local levels for several years. 
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Fricker (2007b), Fricker and Rolka (2006), Stoto et al. (2004), and Pavlin et al. (2003) 
each describe epidemiological or syndromic surveillance, and discuss the issues of 
sensitivity and specificity in the area of health care surveillance. Bravata et al. (2004), 
Sebastiani and Mandl (2004), Heffernan et al. (2004a and 2004b), Loonsk (2004), and 
Wagner et al. (2004), each describe several implementations of syndromic surveillance, 
and Lober et al. (2002) compares several systems that have been used in recent years.  
In epidemiological surveillance, three factors are crucial to success: reporting 
timeliness; analysis of public health data; and high sensitivity and specificity, where high 
specificity is analogous to a low rate of type I errors and therefore an ability to 
distinguish between noise and actual events. Bravata et al. (2004) point to the lack of 
study on sensitivity and specificity in routine health care surveillance, a major 
shortcoming that we will address explicitly in the implementation of our model. 
Additionally, many implementations of epidemiologic surveillance systems are 
seemingly “ad-hoc,” with the common belief that adding more sensors will improve 
detection performance. It is often soon realized following implementation that having 
more sensors leads to higher false alarm rates and no improvement in detection of even 
significant naturally occurring health events.  
To avoid complications from applying our model to an existing system, we will 
apply it to an abstract system that captures the essence of national epidemiological 
surveillance, so as to not get overly specific with the details of any particular system. We 
will assume a centrally monitored system of geographically distributed statistical sensors 
examining health care data on hospital admissions for a single syndrome. We will also 
assume that our system is using a simple Shewhart-type control chart of individual 
observations (say patient admission counts, for example) to examine data in a single 
period of time with systematic effects already removed. As previously discussed, 
temporal effects generally cause some autocorrelation between time periods, but which 
we assume can be removed via appropriate modeling. Future research is needed to apply 
our optimization techniques to other temporal methods such as the CUSUM and EWMA, 
whose statistics are autocorrelated. All other assumptions about independent sensors with 
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non-overlapping coverage still apply. Finally we assume that our control charts are one-
sided to detect only increases in the number of cases.  
The sub-regions we will consider are individual counties; it is assumed that a 
single sensor provides coverage for each county. To determine the regional event 
probability assigned to each county, and in the absence of other information, we use the 
fraction of the population in a particular county (out of the total population of all counties 
present in the model) as a proxy for probability of an outbreak or biological terror attack 
in that county. While likely overly simplistic, in an actual implementation of this method 
these probabilities of attack can be determined by any method desired. That said, using 
population as a surrogate is not necessarily unreasonable. For example, areas such as 
cities that have large, dense populations are more likely than sparsely populated areas to 
experience severe outbreaks of naturally occurring contagious diseases. In terms of 
bioterrorism, it is also not unreasonable to assume the objective of an attack would be to 
kill or sicken as many people as possible and consequently larger cities have greater 
appeal as bioterrorist targets.   
We will now present some models using population to estimate the probability of 
detecting a biological event of interest, such as a bioterrorist attack or natural outbreak, 
which manifests itself as an increase in the distribution underlying the number of cases of 
a particular syndrome in one sensor location. As we develop from simple models of only 
ten to twenty counties to the use of population figures for the two hundred most populous 
counties in the U.S., we examine the policy implications that come along with the 
decision to add more sensors. Often it is assumed that having more sensors will lead to 
improved probability of detection by additional coverage area, but our model reveals that 
there are both costs and benefits of such system expansions.  
Note that throughout our example problems we hold constant the parameters of 
the models we directly compare to each other. These include the magnitude of expected 
distribution shift kσ = 2  and the constraint on expected number of false alarms κ  per 
time period (κ = 1 for the first two small hypothetical models; κ = 4  for the remaining 
models using actual population values). Despite setting these parameters somewhat 
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arbitrarily in our examples, they can easily be changed to explore different scenarios as 
well as the sensitivity of any system to different modeling assumptions.  
C. POPULATION-BASED MODELS  
1. Model Using Ten Counties (STOPT10) 
The model described in Equation (5) is first implemented using fictional 
population data for a set of ten counties (STOPT10). The population of each county is the 
term mi, which we use as the relative weight for each county. Using this relative 
weighting system, each county is then assigned a probability of experiencing an event, 
given that an event occurs, which is its proportion mi M  of the total population M.  
The sensor in each county is assumed to be independent of those in all other 
counties. The populations and the resulting individual thresholds, probabilities of 
detection (pi), and false alarm (α i ), for each sensor, are shown in Table 2 below. The in-
control model assumes the sensor readings are Xi ~ N (0,1)  and the out-of-control 
condition manifests as a 2σ  shift in the mean of the in-control state, resulting in 
 Xi ~ N (2,1)  for one county.  
i  mi  mi M  hi  pi = Φ(hi −δ ) α i = Φ(hi ) 
1 1,000,000 0.169 1.009 0.839 0.156 
2 800,000 0.136 1.121 0.810 0.131 
3 700,000 0.119 1.187 0.792 0.118 
4 600,000 0.102 1.264 0.769 0.103 
5 600,000 0.102 1.264 0.769 0.103 
6 500,000 0.085 1.356 0.740 0.088 
7 500,000 0.085 1.356 0.740 0.088 
8 400,000 0.068 1.467 0.703 0.071 
9 400,000 0.068 1.467 0.703 0.071 
10 400,000 0.068 1.467 0.703 0.071 
Table 2: Model results from ten counties (STOPT10). 
Pd = 0.771 . Assumes an Xi ~ N (0,1)  in-control distribution,  
shift in mean level of 2σ , and false alarm rate limited to κ = 1. 
 
The overall probability of detecting an event of magnitude 2σ  somewhere in the 
region, given that we are willing to accept one false alarm, is 0.771. When we allow for 
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two false alarms, all individual thresholds are lowered and the overall probability 
increases to 0.881. The two rightmost columns ( pi  and α i ) are the individual 
probabilities of detection and false alarm, respectively, for each individual county i, for 
the case of one false alarm per time period. As we lower individual thresholds to improve 
pi , the individual false alarm probabilities α i  increase.  
One factor to keep in mind throughout the discussion of population-based models 
is the fact that the distribution of the total population is skewed rather heavily toward a 
relatively small number of areas. It is likely to be the case in other implementations that 
large percentages of population will be concentrated in a few areas such as major cities, 
with the remainder spread over a large number of smaller rural areas.  
2. Model Using Twenty Counties (STOPT20): Effects of Adding More 
Sensors to the System 
Expanding the population-based model STOPT10 depicted in Table 2 to twenty 
counties provides the model output STOPT20 in Table 3. Counties #1 through #10 are 
the same as in STOPT10. Allowing for one false alarm per time period, the overall 
probability of detection of a 2σ event for STOPT20 is 0.662. As before, allowing for 
more false alarms allows all thresholds hi to be lowered, resulting in higher probabilities 
of detection pi. Allowing for two false alarms the probability of detection of the same 2σ  
event is 0.782. The detection thresholds hi for each of the ten largest counties are higher 
in STOPT20 than for the same scenario in STOPT10, resulting in lower individual 
probabilities of detection pi but also lower probabilities of false alarm α i .  
The effect of scaling-up the problem from ten to twenty counties is clearly 
negative for the ten largest counties due to lower individual probabilities of detection pi; 
yet the benefit to counties #11 through #20 is obvious because in the second model they 
each have some level of sensor coverage, where previously they had none.  
A key area for statistical and policy analysis is as follows. Adding additional 
sensors to cover less-populous areas detracts from the more-populous areas and from the 
overall probability of detecting an event of a given magnitude (given the event occurs in 
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one of the more-populous areas), but there is significant individual benefit to the counties 
that are added. Does the additional benefit gained by providing coverage to more of the 
population outweigh the lower probability of detection for the most populous counties?  
i  mi  mi M  hi  pi = Φ(hi −δ ) α i = Φ(hi ) 
1 1,000,000 0.119 1.200 0.788 0.115 
2 800,000 0.095 1.311 0.755 0.095 
3 700,000 0.083 1.377 0.733 0.084 
4 600,000 0.071 1.456 0.707 0.073 
5 600,000 0.071 1.456 0.707 0.073 
6 500,000 0.060 1.546 0.675 0.061 
7 500,000 0.060 1.546 0.675 0.061 
8 400,000 0.048 1.657 0.634 0.049 
9 400,000 0.048 1.657 0.634 0.049 
10 400,000 0.048 1.657 0.634 0.049 
11 300,000 0.036 1.801 0.579 0.036 
12 300,000 0.036 1.801 0.579 0.036 
13 300,000 0.036 1.801 0.579 0.036 
14 300,000 0.036 1.801 0.579 0.036 
15 250,000 0.030 1.893 0.543 0.029 
16 250,000 0.030 1.893 0.543 0.029 
17 250,000 0.030 1.893 0.543 0.029 
18 200,000 0.024 2.003 0.499 0.023 
19 200,000 0.024 2.003 0.499 0.023 
20 150,000 0.018 2.147 0.441 0.016 
Table 3: Model results from twenty counties (STOPT20). 
Pd = 0.662 . Assumes an Xi ~ N (0,1)  in-control distribution,  
shift in mean level of 2σ , and false alarm rate limited to κ = 1. 
 
3. Model Using 200 Counties (STOPT200): A Practical Application of 
the Model to the U.S. 
The models in the preceding two sub-sections are now expanded to a 
representative system of sensors to monitor the populations of the two hundred largest 
counties in the United States (STOPT200). This is the largest single model that can be 
tested using the standard Excel solver applied to an n-variable optimization problem. For 
STOPT200, the in-control situation is assumed to be a standard normal distribution 
 Xi ~ N (0,1) . Assuming a limit on false alarms to an arbitrarily chosen rate of four per 
time period, the probabilities of detecting an event with a given shift from the in-control 
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mean are given in Table 4. A table showing complete results and individual counties’ 
probabilities of detection for a 2σ  shift is shown in Appendix C; the following sections 
will expand analysis upon this model to explore different assumptions and inputs to the 
model. 
Magnitude of Shift Probability of Detection
σ = 1  0.230 
σ = 2  0.537 
σ = 3 0.851 
Table 4: Comparison of probabilities of detection for various magnitudes of shift      
using STOPT200. 
Assumes an  Xi ~ N (0,1)  in-control mean, with an expected value of κ = 4   
false alarms per time period. 
 
Expanding upon this analysis, we now compare the results of our approach with 
the results achieved from naively setting equal thresholds for all sensors to achieve the 
same probabilities of detection. These results are summarized in Table 5 for various 
magnitudes of distributional shift in the background incidence levels. For each magnitude 
of shift, we set performance as a constant in terms of probability of detection, with our 
optimization model maintaining a false alarm rate of four per time period as before. For 
each magnitude of shift in the mean, we solve for the set of equal thresholds hi that will 
give us the desired probability of detection. Note that in order to achieve comparable 
detection performance against each shift, the false alarm rates incurred by the naïve 
method increase dramatically. This is a result of setting thresholds too high for a 
relatively small number of large counties and too low for the large number of small 
counties. For a 2σ  shift, the optimized thresholds for Los Angeles County (#1) and 
Lorain County, OH (#200), were 0.812 and 2.560, respectively. In a practical sense, the 
naïve system of equal thresholds is a misallocation of resources, where the locations with 
more population (“weight” in a generic sense) receive too little sensitivity and those with 


















σ = 1  0.230 1.739 4 8.206 105.2% 
σ = 2  0.537 1.907 4 5.651 41.3% 
σ = 3 0.851 1.959 4 5.008 25.2% 
Table 5: Comparison of false alarm rates between naïve and optimized methods        
using STOPT200. 
 
4. Comparison of the Performance of the U.S. Counties Models for 10, 
20, 40, 100, and 200 Counties 
A key issue that must be discussed by policymakers is that of how many sensors 
to employ. As mentioned previously when we looked at ten- and twenty-county models, 
the overall probability of detection of an event decreased when we increased the number 
of counties. However, the additional counties that previously had no coverage benefited a 
great deal by adding sensors.  
In the national epidemiologic surveillance context, there likely will be conflict 
between the local and national public health authorities on this issue. Those in heavily-
populated cities and counties will advocate having fewer sensors located in only the 
most-populous areas in order to provide the highest probabilities of detection in those 
localities, which because of their large populations present themselves as obvious targets 
to bioterrorists. National authorities may argue either way. One argument is similar to 
that just discussed, that of concentrating national surveillance efforts in the most-
populous areas; they would use the higher probability of detection as an argument to 
prevent expansion of the system. The other argument is that by leaving large numbers of 
counties and therefore a large proportion of the population uncovered—possibly many 
smaller counties whose total populations are larger than that of the handful of largest 
counties—that other populous areas are left unprotected and are therefore attractive 
targets. Table 6 and Figure 3 demonstrate that the overall probability of detection for 
events of given magnitudes decrease as more sensors are added to the system.  
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# Counties: 10 20 40 100 200 
σ = 1  0.791 0.614 0.459 0.305 0.230
σ = 2  0.964 0.890 0.790 0.641 0.537
σ = 3 0.997 0.986 0.962 0.907 0.851
Table 6: Overall detection performance (Pd) for various numbers of sensors              
versus a 2σ  shift. 
Assumes false alarm rate of κ = 4  per time period. 
 
 
Figure 3: Overall detection performance (Pd) for various numbers of sensors             
versus a 2σ  shift. 
Assumes false alarm rate of κ = 4  per time period. 
 
This thesis has already demonstrated that adding more sensors to a system has 
both costs and benefits. The marginal sensor adds detection capability for the county 
where it is installed, increasing the probability of detection from zero to some appreciable 
level. But this addition detracts from counties with sensors already installed, particularly 




D. EXCURSIONS FROM STOPT200 
1. Effect of Placing Additional Constraints on Individual Thresholds  
In implementing a model like STOPT200, we may want to add additional 
constraints to tailor the model to specific needs. Using constraints similar to those in 
Equations (6) and (7), we will examine two cases. The first is the case where we desire to 
artificially set a threshold higher than the optimal hi
*  from STOPT200 to drive down 
false alarm probability at that location; in the second case we want to set the threshold 
lower to improve detection probability in a certain location.  
The first case is that of setting an upper limit on the probability of false alarm for 
a particular sensor. In the output of STOPT200 (two hundred counties) shown in 
Appendix C, we notice that in Los Angeles County (#1), if no event occurs, there will be 
a 0.209 probability of experiencing a false alarm. If this is felt to be excessive, we can 
force this probability (or any other α i ) to be lower by setting a constraint on the 
maximum allowed probability of false alarm. Adding the constraint α1 ≤ 0.15  results in a 
higher threshold h1 and lower probability of detection in the county, down from 0.883 to 
0.832. Solving STOPT200 with the additional constraint results in an overall probability 
of detection of 0.537, unchanged from the previous optimal solution. The impact on other 
counties is minimal, with only very minor changes in probabilities of detection and false 
alarm (all less than about six percent, and most less than one percent).  
The other case is that of ensuring that the probability of detection at a particular 
sensor meets a specified minimum probability of detection. This could be due to a high-
profile event such as a major political or trade convention or sporting event where large 
crowds could be targeted. This situation of tuning sensors already in-place is a variation 
on the use of drop-in surveillance discussed in Fricker (2007b), Hutwagner (2003), 
Toprani et al. (2005), and Sebastiani and Mandl (2004). Alternatively this method could 
be used to compensate an area that has a lower assigned probability of attack than its 
importance or perception as a potential target. For example, Washington, D.C., is the 
23rd–most populous city in the U.S., yet because of the concentration of federal 
 31
government facilities and workers, it should be given a “weight” comparable to that of 
the most-populous city, New York. For our example, we will look at Denver County, 
Colorado. With approximately 567,000 people in 2006, it was the 105th-most populous 
county, and will be the site of the 2008 Democratic National Convention.  
In this second case, we add a constraint of the form in Equation (7) to establish a 
minimum probability of detection in that location. Again referring back to the optimized 
output of STOPT200 in Appendix C, we see that the probability of detection in Denver 
County is only about forty percent (0.404). Our new constraint on STOPT200 to require a 
minimum probability of detection in Denver County takes the form ρ105 ≥ ρmin . Table 7 
shows the results of several minimum probabilities of detection for Denver, with ρmin  
ranging from 0.500 to 0.900. As the requirement for detection probability becomes more 
stringent, we notice the thresholds h105 going down which also results in higher false 
alarm rates α105 . 
Solution  pmin  h105  α105  Pd  
1 0.404 2.244 0.012 0.537 
2 0.500 2.000 0.023 0.537 
3 0.600 1.747 0.040 0.537 
4 0.700 1.476 0.070 0.536 
5 0.800 1.158 0.123 0.534 
6 0.900 0.718 0.236 0.530 
Table 7: Effects of various threshold constraints for Denver County, CO.  
Solution 1 denotes previous optimal solution. 
 
This scenario of the national political convention motivated us to change the 
requirements of the STOPT200 model. Denver County’s threshold h105 was lowered to 
increase its probability of detecting an event of magnitude 2σ . If we desire a probability 
of detection in this county as high as ninety percent, we will have to lower Denver’s 
threshold to 0.718, roughly the same as the fifth-largest county (h5 = 0.714). The system-
wide effect of changing the threshold in just one county by this large amount, however, is 
minimal, with the overall probability of detection falling by just 0.7 percentage points. In 
contrast to the uniform downward shift of all thresholds hi as discussed earlier in this 
section, we are only shifting one threshold to improve detection performance in that 
location. It is possible to set constraints on multiple sensors, but care must be given not to 
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over-constrain the model; doing so could severely degrade overall performance by 
moving the system too far from the optimal combination.  
Note that it is necessary to re-solve the optimization after setting these additional 
constraints. If instead we only adjust the desired threshold h105 without re-solving, the 
false alarm constraint would be exceeded; for h1 the expected number of false alarms 
would be less than the constraint, and we would have an artificially low probability of 
detection. 
2. Effect of a Uniform Downward Shift in Individual Thresholds hi by 
All Sensors 
Given the optimal solutions generated in the previous chapter, one scenario that 
comes to mind is that of implementing a uniform shift of all thresholds hi. The motivation 
for this could be an increased likelihood of an event somewhere in the region, and a 
willingness to handle additional false alarms during a particular, although limited, time 
frame. Thus, after optimizing STOPT200 as before, we lower all hi’s by the same 
percentage to increase the probability of detection until the number of expected false 
alarms reaches an upper limit deemed acceptable. The converse situation of raising all 
hi’s seems less likely to occur. Note that a one hundred percent decrease in all hi’s results 
in all thresholds becoming equal to zero. A threshold of hi = 0 results in a probability of 
detection equal to 0.977 for a shift of magnitude 2σ , but there will be a very high 
number of false alarms as each piece of random noise results in a false alarm.  
The effect that we expect from gradually lowering all hi’s is to see an increasing 
probability of detection and an increasing number of false alarms. Figure 4 demonstrates 
that the rate of increase of false alarms outstrips the rate of increase in probability of 
detection. We notice that on the left-hand side of the graph the “P(Detection)” curve is 
relatively steep and the “# False Alarms” curve is relatively flat; the converse is true on 
the right-hand side of the graph where the probability of detection is asymptotic to 1.00 
and the number of false alarms is increasing rapidly. The effect is that of diminishing 
marginal returns from decreasing the set of hi’s. We conclude that a small system-wide 
percentage decrease in hi’s is appropriate to increase overall probability of detection, 
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keeping in mind that the percentage increase in false alarms will be much greater than the 
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Figure 4: Effects on performance (Pd) from uniform percentage decrease in all 
thresholds. 
Assumes a 2σ  shift in mean disease incidence level from Xi ~ N(0,1)  in-control mean. 
 
3. Effect of Independent Shifts in Thresholds hi by All Sensors 
Given an optimal solution for appropriate detection thresholds from STOPT200, 
one policy possibility is to give each locality some amount of autonomy to adjust its 
sensor’s threshold hi up or down. The threshold decision by each sensor would be arrived 
at by examining a variety of factors for its area, including scarcity of resources to 
investigate additional false alarms (forces a higher hi), or a desire to increase probability 
of detection even at risk of higher false alarms (forces a lower hi). It may be decided to 
allow each locality to raise or lower its threshold by up to a certain percentage.  
 34
We simulate these perturbations of each sensor’s detection threshold about the 
optimal hi found in STOPT200 to generate a new set of hi’s. Each new threshold is a 
normal random variable with its mean equal to the original hi and standard deviation of 
p·hi where p is the percentage of fluctuation that we allow for the sensor. Thus, the new hi 
is a random variable ~ ( , )i i iY N h p h• . This vector of new random variables results in 
more variability, and therefore more freedom, to areas with smaller populations or 
weights and less variability to areas with larger populations, which have a larger effect on 
the overall system performance.  
For the simulation, samples of one hundred sets of random hi’s were generated for 
each allowed percentage of fluctuation. Again, there are two measures that are of interest 
to us as we examine this possibility: the average probability of detection and number of 
false alarms at each level. Figures 4 and 5 show a typical results for probability of 
detection and number of false alarms for percentages ranging from five to two hundred 
percent of the hi values. As the percentage of fluctuation increases, the mean probability 
of detection stays relatively constant (Figure 5). This indicates that even as we increase 
the amount of shift in hi, the probability of detection does not change noticeably.  
 




However, as the percentage of fluctuation in hi increases, the number of false 
alarms increases significantly (Figure 6). Despite causing very little change in probability 
of detection, an increase in the percentage of allowable change in hi by two hundred 
percent raises the average number of false alarms by nearly sixteen hundred percent, from 
four false alarms to sixty-two per period. Even a thirty percent change in hi causes a 
doubling of the rate of false alarms.  
 
Figure 6: Effect on overall false alarms of STOPT200 by random shifts in          
individual thresholds. 
 
Clearly when individual sub-regions are allowed to vary their thresholds widely, 
Figure 5 shows there is no additional benefit to the system overall, while Figure 6 shows 
the false alarms rise dramatically. But if the percentage of fluctuation allowed is kept 
under twenty percent or so, the false alarm rate stays relatively constant at or below five 
per time period. 
E. ANALYTICAL SOLUTIONS 
The assumption of normality leads us to a simplified optimization solution that 
reduces the n-variable problem of Equation (5) to a one-variable optimization problem. 
Appendix B and Fricker and Banschbach (2008) discuss the derivation, which takes 
advantage of some useful properties of the normal distribution. The result is a log-linear 
relationship between the individual county’s probability of a biologic event of interest 
somewhere in the country, and the set of optimal thresholds hi.  
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We apply this new, reduced model to more easily solve the problem of setting 
thresholds for two hundred counties with the same outcome as presented in Section C.3 
of this chapter. Because the single-variable nonlinear optimization problem solves much 
faster than the n-dimensional problems we have already shown, we are able to quickly 
solve problems of practically unlimited size, without experiencing problems due to 
number of variables. Below we discuss the impact of placing one threshold sensor in each 
of the 3,141 counties in the United States, and compare the results with that of the model 
for only two hundred counties.  
For these examples we keep the same parameters as in previous sections of this 
chapter, with the limit on expected number of false alarms maintained at four per time 
period (κ = 4 ). The overall probability of detection falls from 0.537 in STOPT200 to 
0.518 for 3,141 counties (STOPT3141). Table 8 shows an excerpt from the output of 
STOPT3141. (A larger excerpt showing more counties is included in Appendix D.) The 
ten largest counties are included, with other selected counties representing every ten 
percent decrease in individual probability of detection. There is a positive effect for the 
largest counties in terms of probability of detection, but clearly a negligible benefit for 
smaller counties as the thresholds set for counties #1325 (in rank by population) and 
smaller are more than double the magnitude of the shift for which we are monitoring. In 
fact, 4σ  and higher thresholds are assigned beginning at county #884. Even following a 
2σ  shift, Jackson County, Ohio (#1325), will be in the right-hand tail region of the out-
of-control distribution, 2.34σ  beyond the new mean µ1 = 2 .  
Figure 7 is a map showing all 3,141 counties, with shading to indicate their 
relative probabilities of event (here, “probability of attack” in the bioterrorism context) 
and their assigned optimal thresholds hi. An example of a system of distributed statistical 
sensors on the same magnitude as this large model is the BioSense system operated by 
the Centers for Disease Control. This implementation of national biological surveillance 
has over 1600 sensors distributed throughout the United States. Figure 8 shows sensor 
locations for BioSense-equipped civilian hospitals and Department of Defense and 
Veterans Administration medical facilities superimposed on a population density map of 
the United States. (CDC)  
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However, the smaller counties receive very little coverage because of their small 
populations. We see from STOPT3141 that there is less than a one percent probability of 
detection of an event of magnitude 2σ  from county #1325 through #3141. For county 
#368 and smaller we see less than a ten percent probability of detection of a 2σ  event. 
All other counties between #1 and #200 that are presented can be compared directly to 
the results from the two hundred counties model using Table 9.   
i  County, State mi  mi M  hi  p(di )  p(α i )  
1 Los Angeles County, CA 9,948,081 0.0332 0.45 0.939 0.326 
2 Cook County, IL 5,288,655 0.0177 0.88 0.868 0.188 
3 Harris County, TX 3,886,207 0.0130 1.09 0.817 0.137 
4 Maricopa County, AZ 3,768,123 0.0126 1.12 0.812 0.132 
5 Orange County, CA 3,002,048 0.0100 1.27 0.767 0.102 
6 San Diego County, CA 2,941,454 0.0098 1.28 0.763 0.099 
7 Kings County, NY 2,508,820 0.0084 1.39 0.728 0.082 
8 Miami-Dade County, FL 2,402,208 0.0080 1.42 0.718 0.077 
9 Dallas County, TX 2,345,815 0.0078 1.44 0.712 0.075 
10 Queens County, NY 2,255,175 0.0075 1.47 0.703 0.071 
21 Suffolk County, NY 1,469,715 0.0049 1.76 0.595 0.039 
36 Contra Costa Co., CA 1,024,319 0.0034 2.01 0.498 0.022 
77 Lake County, IL 713,076 0.0024 2.25 0.400 0.012 
132 Chester County, PA 482,112 0.0016 2.52 0.301 0.006 
200 Lorain County, OH 301,993 0.0010 2.84 0.200 0.002 
368 Brazos County, TX 159,006 0.0005 3.28 0.100 0.001 
1325 Jackson County, OH 33,543 0.0001 4.34 0.010 0.000 
Table 8: Excerpt from model setting thresholds for 3,141 counties (STOPT3141). 
Overall probability of detection 0.515. Assumes a 2σ  shift and false alarm limit κ = 4 . 
 
Because we have previously shown that adding more sensors reduces detection 
performance of the most populous counties, we now explore what happens if we shrink 
this system back down to the point where all sensors have at least a ten percent 
probability of detection. If we remove all counties below #368 and re-solve the problem  
(STOPT368) to keep within our false alarm constraint, the probability of detection 
increases slightly from 0.518 to 0.523 for κ = 4.000  false alarms. The overall probability 
of detection increases by 0.5 percentage points and the individual probabilities of 
detection for the largest counties increase, while we can presume that there are significant 
cost savings by not installing or operating these 2,700-plus sensors.  
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Thus far in this section we have treated each county’s share mi M  of the total 
population M as a probability of experiencing a biological event of interest, either a 
terrorist attack or a natural disease outbreak. By optimizing using the model STOPT in 
Equation (5) we achieve a set of optimal thresholds hi that achieve a relatively high 
probability of detection (more than half) for the magnitude shift we have assumed 
throughout the use of population models in this thesis. However, some might insist on 
using the same detection threshold in each county, in order to give each county an equal 
probability of detection of the expected shift.  
  Threshold hi  p(di )  p(α i )  
i  County, State 3,141 200  3,141 200  3,141 200  
1 Los Angeles County, CA 0.45 0.81 0.939 0.883 0.326 0.209 
2 Cook County, IL 0.88 1.13 0.868 0.809 0.188 0.130 
3 Harris County, TX 1.09 1.28 0.817 0.764 0.137 0.100 
4 Maricopa County, AZ 1.12 1.30 0.812 0.759 0.132 0.097 
5 Orange County, CA 1.27 1.41 0.767 0.722 0.102 0.079 
6 San Diego County, CA 1.28 1.42 0.763 0.719 0.099 0.078 
7 Kings County, NY 1.39 1.50 0.728 0.691 0.082 0.067 
8 Miami-Dade County, FL 1.42 1.52 0.718 0.684 0.077 0.064 
9 Dallas County, TX 1.44 1.53 0.712 0.679 0.075 0.063 
10 Queens County, NY 1.47 1.55 0.703 0.672 0.071 0.060 
21 Suffolk County, NY 1.76 1.77 0.595 0.592 0.039 0.039 
36 Contra Costa Co., CA 2.01 1.95 0.498 0.521 0.022 0.026 
77 Lake County, IL 2.25 2.13 0.400 0.449 0.012 0.017 
132 Chester County, PA 2.52 2.33 0.301 0.373 0.006 0.010 
200 Lorain County, OH 2.84 2.56 0.200 0.288 0.002 0.005 
Table 9: Comparison of results for 3,141 counties vs. 200 counties 
(Selected counties). Assumes a 2σ  shift and limit on false alarms κ = 4.000 . 
 
If we take this approach of setting equal thresholds for all 3,141 counties in an 
attempt to detect a 2σ  shift somewhere in the country, the performance of our system 
suffers greatly. All thresholds will be set at h = 3.02 to achieve a false alarm rate of four 
per time period. Note that this threshold is fifty percent above the expected magnitude of 
the shift. The false alarm rate will be less than one percent (0.001) in all locations. The 
system-side probability of detection will only be 0.154, equal to the probabilities of each 




Figure 7: Output from optimizing 3,141 counties (STOPT3141). 
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Figure 8: Centers for Disease Control (CDC) map of BioSense sensor locations superimposed on county population density. 
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IV. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
In this thesis we have presented a model using mathematical optimization tools 
and software to improve the performance of a system of threshold sensors, given an 
existing set of sensors, an expected minimum expected magnitude of shift in the 
distributional mean at a single location, and some constraint on the acceptable number or 
rate of false alarms. We have formally presented an example that demonstrates that a 
system is not necessarily improved by adding more sensors. In fact, doing so will cause 
negative effects on the overall system’s probability of detection, holding all else constant, 
as well as on the detection performance in those locations that already have sensor 
coverage.  
The implications for policymakers are clear. It is not sufficient to simply add 
sensors to an existing sensor network in an informal fashion and expect improved 
performance. While additional coverage may be gained, to the benefit of those areas 
receiving new sensors, the overall detection performance of the system may be degraded. 
Additionally, to meet the defined limit on the expected number of false alarms, the 
individual thresholds of all sensors must be adjusted. Adding one new sensor without 
adjusting thresholds will cause an increase in the system-wide false alarm rate; adding 
many sensors will cause significant increases in the system-wide false alarm rate.  
B. AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This research has focused on the problem of simultaneously setting detection 
thresholds in multiple locations. We have assumed away the problem of adjusting 
thresholds for temporal factors such as day-of-week and seasonal effects, which have 
been studied extensively in other applications of SPC to detection problems involving 
single sensors. Future work should develop optimization models for detection systems 
based on the CUSUM and EWMA techniques, which can be more sensitive to detecting 
small shifts.  
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There are many areas where our models can be applied. Any system of distributed 
sensors that monitors for an increase in a statistic over a network with a large number of 
sensors should benefit from this work. These include many of the previous non-industrial 
applications of statistical process control discussed in Chapter I, including service 
performance, finance, health care monitoring, outbreak detection, water quality 
monitoring, and maintenance. There may even be applications for industry—despite 
having production quality measurements based on engineering requirements, it may be 
desirable to set optimal warning or control limits on machines and processes that are 
based on criticality, likelihood to drift to an out-of-control state, or to experience other 
types of failures.  
In our discussion, we have made the assumption of one independent sensor per 
sub-region. There are practical issues that arise from such an assumption, namely the 
adequacy of coverage for a large sub-region. It is unlikely to be the case that areas farther 
away from the sensor will receive equal coverage as those near the sensor itself. For 
example, a sensor covering a single county may provide good coverage to the city in 
which it is located, but rural areas far away from that city are not likely to receive equal 
coverage. This has a practical application to epidemiologic surveillance, in that it is 
possible for an outbreak to start in a rural area and spread to the city. If the increase in 
cases can be detected before the spread to the city occurs, steps can be taken to mitigate 
the effects of the outbreak.  
This suggests that regions are likely to employ multiple sensors and an area for 
future study is how to integrate multiple sensors providing coverage for a single area. 
How should data from multiple sensors in a sub-region be compiled and analyzed? We 
suggest two options for future consideration. The first uses sensor fusion to compile data 
received at multiple sensors within a sub-region; the data from these sensors are then 
treated in aggregate as though received at a single sensor, with a threshold assigned by 
the solution to the optimization problem for the entire region. The second option is to 
solve the large regional problem first using our optimization model; subsequently we 
apply this model to solve a subordinate optimization problem for the multiple sensors 
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within a given sub-region to set thresholds and allocate the expected number of false 
positives according to the weights assigned or populations covered by each sensor.  
A final statement should be made as to the adoption of optimization techniques to 
improve the performance of a system. As in previous efforts to use statistical process 
control for monitoring non-industrial processes, it is important to systematically 
implement such a system and to trust the results that the model provides. Training must 
be provided throughout the organization to ensure that the process itself and the benefits 
derived from it are understood and appreciated by all members. We previously referred to 
the “ad-hoc” nature of sensor implementation in the biosurveillance context; such lack of 
strategy often leads to piecemeal implementation, which can result in sub-optimal system 
performance and even complete failure due to loss of confidence in the system resulting 
from problems such as rampant false signaling.  
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APPENDIX A. GAMS CODE FOR SAMPLE PROBLEM 
10 fictional sub-regions, based on an ~ (0,1)X N  in-control distribution, a 2σ  
shift in the mean incidence level, and false alarm limit κ = 1. 
 
OPTIONS 
  NLP=MINOS 
  optca = 0 
  optcr = 0; 
 
SET 
  i        Sub-region index/County01*County10/; 
 
SCALARS 
  K        Max allowed false alarms in region /1/ 
  delta    Magnitude of shift in mean level  /2/ 
  total    Total weight of region; 
 
PARAMETERS 
  m(i)     Relative weight of sub-region i 
 
/ 
County01   1000000 
County02   800000 
County03   700000 
County04   600000 
County05   600000 
County06   500000 
County07   500000 
County08   400000 
County09   400000 





     totalWeight=sum(i,m(i)); 
 
PARAMETER pa(i); 
     pa(i) = m(i)/totalWeight; 
 
VARIABLE h(i)  Detection threshold in sub-region i; 
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VARIABLE PD    Overall probability of detection given event 
occurs in region; 
 
EQUATIONS 
  OBJ          Overall probability of detection given event 
occurs in region 




  OBJ..    PD=E=sum(i,pa(i)*(1-errorf(h(i)-delta))); 




SOLVE Regions USING NLP MAXIMIZING PD 
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APPENDIX B. DERIVATION OF ONE-DIMENSIONAL 
OPTIMIZATION MODEL 
We have assumed that our in-control distribution F0  is a standard normal 
distribution, F0 ~ N(0,1) , and that the signal manifests itself as a shift in the mean to a 
new distribution F1 ~ N(δ ,1) , δ > 0 . Using the log-linear relationship derived in this 
section, the model of Equation (5) can be expressed as a one-dimensional optimization 
problem, which is much easier and faster to solve than the n-dimensional problems 
solved previously.  
By observing that maximizing the area to the right of hi on a normal distribution is 
equivalent to minimizing the area to the left of hi, and that our optimal solution is located 
on the constraint boundary (see Fricker and Banschbach, 2008), we can re-express the 
maximization problem in (5) in the following way:  
minimize
h
Φ(hi − δ )pi
i=1
n∑
subject to Φ(hi ) = n −κ
i=1
n∑
     (8) 
Working on the constraint first, we separate the first term of the summation and re-
express this constraint as 
Φ(h1) + Φ(hi ) = n −κ
i=2
n∑      (9) 
Solving (9) for h1 we get 
h1 = Φ−1 n −κ − Φ(hi )
i=2
n∑⎛⎝⎜ ⎞⎠⎟      (10) 
Following a similar pattern for the objective function we can separate the first 
term of the summation h1 and express (8) as 
min
h
f = Φ[h1 − δ ]p1 + Φ(hi − δ )pi
i=2
n∑    (11) 
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Substituting the expression for h1 (10) into the objective function (11) gives us an 
unconstrained optimization problem: 
min
h
f = Φ Φ−1 n −κ − Φ(hi )
i=2
n∑⎛⎝⎜ ⎞⎠⎟ − δ⎡⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
+ Φ(hi − δ )pi
i=2
n∑   (12) 
To find the set of hi’s at which f is minimized, we first differentiate (12) with 
respect to each threshold hi and set each equation equal to zero. We then simultaneously 
solve the set of equations for each hi. The solution for n = 2 is as follows. After solving 
for h1 in the constraint and substituting into the now-unconstrained objective function, the 










⎠⎟ p2 exp[h2δ ]− p1 exp 2δErf
















2π  (13) 
We can easily see that (13) will equal zero only if  











  (14) 
Taking the natural log of both sides of (14) and simplifying yields 
Erf













⎠⎟    (15) 
We know that  Erf z / 2( )= 2Φ z( )−1, so we can further simplify (15) to  
Φ h2 + 1δ ln p2( )−
1
δ ln p1( )⎛⎝⎜ ⎞⎠⎟ + Φ h2( )= 2 −κ    (16) 
Making the substitution  µ = h2 + 1δ ln p2( ), we get 
Φ µ − 1δ ln pi( )⎡⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥i=1
2∑ = 2 −κ      (17) 
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The expression in (17) is equivalent to 
2
1
1Pr ln( ) 2i
i
Z pµ κδ=
⎛ ⎞≤ − = −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑     (18) 
Here Z is a standard normal random variate. Using the expression in (18), we see that the 
constrained minimization problem in (8) reduces to finding µ  such that the sum of the 
left tails of n normal distributions is equal to n −κ , where 0 ≤ n −κ ≤ n .  
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APPENDIX C. EXCEL RESULTS FOR STOPT200 
Terms: mi, Population in county i; mi/M, county share mi of total population M; hi, 
threshold level set in county i; p(di), probability of detection in county i; p(α i ) , 
probability of detection in county i. 
Based on an  Xi ~ N (0,1)  in-control distribution and a 2σ  shift in the mean incidence 
level. Overall Pd = 0.537, E(false alarms) = 4. 
 
i  County, State mi  mi M  hi  p(di )  p(α i )  
1 Los Angeles County, CA 9,948,081 0.0587 0.812 0.883 0.209 
2 Cook County, IL 5,288,655 0.0312 1.127 0.809 0.130 
3 Harris County, TX 3,886,207 0.0229 1.282 0.764 0.100 
4 Maricopa County, AZ 3,768,123 0.0222 1.297 0.759 0.097 
5 Orange County, CA 3,002,048 0.0177 1.411 0.722 0.079 
6 San Diego County, CA 2,941,454 0.0174 1.421 0.719 0.078 
7 Kings County, NY 2,508,820 0.0148 1.500 0.691 0.067 
8 Miami-Dade County, FL 2,402,208 0.0142 1.522 0.684 0.064 
9 Dallas County, TX 2,345,815 0.0138 1.534 0.679 0.063 
10 Queens County, NY 2,255,175 0.0133 1.553 0.672 0.060 
11 Riverside County, CA 2,026,803 0.0120 1.607 0.653 0.054 
12 San Bernardino County, CA 1,999,332 0.0118 1.614 0.650 0.053 
13 Wayne County, MI 1,971,853 0.0116 1.621 0.648 0.052 
14 King County, WA 1,826,732 0.0108 1.659 0.633 0.049 
15 Broward County, FL 1,787,636 0.0105 1.670 0.629 0.047 
16 Clark County, NV 1,777,539 0.0105 1.673 0.628 0.047 
17 Santa Clara County, CA 1,731,281 0.0102 1.686 0.623 0.046 
18 Tarrant County, TX 1,671,295 0.0099 1.703 0.617 0.044 
19 New York County, NY 1,611,581 0.0095 1.721 0.610 0.043 
20 Bexar County, TX 1,555,592 0.0092 1.739 0.603 0.041 
21 Suffolk County, NY 1,469,715 0.0087 1.767 0.592 0.039 
22 Middlesex County, MA 1,467,016 0.0087 1.768 0.592 0.039 
23 Alameda County, CA 1,457,426 0.0086 1.771 0.590 0.038 
24 Philadelphia County, PA 1,448,394 0.0085 1.775 0.589 0.038 
25 Sacramento County, CA 1,374,724 0.0081 1.801 0.579 0.036 
26 Bronx County, NY 1,361,473 0.0080 1.806 0.577 0.035 
27 Nassau County, NY 1,325,662 0.0078 1.819 0.572 0.034 
28 Cuyahoga County, OH 1,314,241 0.0078 1.824 0.570 0.034 
29 Palm Beach County, FL 1,274,013 0.0075 1.839 0.564 0.033 
30 Allegheny County, PA 1,223,411 0.0072 1.860 0.556 0.031 
31 Oakland County, MI 1,214,255 0.0072 1.864 0.554 0.031 
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i  County, State mi  mi M  hi  p(di )  p(α i )  
32 Hillsborough County, FL 1,157,738 0.0068 1.888 0.545 0.030 
33 Hennepin County, MN 1,122,093 0.0066 1.903 0.539 0.029 
34 Franklin County, OH 1,095,662 0.0065 1.915 0.534 0.028 
35 Orange County, FL 1,043,500 0.0062 1.939 0.524 0.026 
36 Contra Costa County, CA 1,024,319 0.0060 1.948 0.521 0.026 
37 Fairfax County, VA 1,010,443 0.0060 1.955 0.518 0.025 
38 St. Louis County, MO 1,000,510 0.0059 1.960 0.516 0.025 
39 Salt Lake County, UT 978,701 0.0058 1.971 0.512 0.024 
40 Fulton County, GA 960,009 0.0057 1.980 0.508 0.024 
41 Westchester County, NY 949,355 0.0056 1.986 0.506 0.024 
42 Pima County, AZ 946,362 0.0056 1.988 0.505 0.023 
43 DuPage County, IL 932,670 0.0055 1.995 0.502 0.023 
44 Montgomery County, MD 932,131 0.0055 1.995 0.502 0.023 
45 Pinellas County, FL 924,413 0.0055 1.999 0.500 0.023 
46 Erie County, NY 921,390 0.0054 2.001 0.500 0.023 
47 Travis County, TX 921,006 0.0054 2.001 0.500 0.023 
48 Milwaukee County, WI 915,097 0.0054 2.004 0.498 0.023 
49 Shelby County, TN 911,438 0.0054 2.006 0.497 0.022 
50 Honolulu County, HI 909,863 0.0054 2.007 0.497 0.022 
51 Bergen County, NJ 904,037 0.0053 2.010 0.496 0.022 
52 Fairfield County, CT 900,440 0.0053 2.012 0.495 0.022 
53 Fresno County, CA 891,756 0.0053 2.017 0.493 0.022 
54 Hartford County, CT 876,927 0.0052 2.026 0.490 0.021 
55 Marion County, IN 865,504 0.0051 2.032 0.487 0.021 
56 New Haven County, CT 845,244 0.0050 2.044 0.482 0.020 
57 Prince George's County, MD 841,315 0.0050 2.046 0.482 0.020 
58 Duval County, FL 837,964 0.0049 2.048 0.481 0.020 
59 Macomb County, MI 832,861 0.0049 2.051 0.479 0.020 
60 Mecklenburg County, NC 827,445 0.0049 2.055 0.478 0.020 
61 Hamilton County, OH 822,596 0.0049 2.058 0.477 0.020 
62 Ventura County, CA 799,720 0.0047 2.072 0.471 0.019 
63 Baltimore County, MD 787,384 0.0046 2.080 0.468 0.019 
64 Middlesex County, NJ 786,971 0.0046 2.080 0.468 0.019 
65 Wake County, NC 786,522 0.0046 2.080 0.468 0.019 
66 Essex County, NJ 786,147 0.0046 2.080 0.468 0.019 
67 Worcester County, MA 784,992 0.0046 2.081 0.468 0.019 
68 Kern County, CA 780,117 0.0046 2.084 0.466 0.019 
69 Montgomery County, PA 775,688 0.0046 2.087 0.465 0.018 
70 Pierce County, WA 766,878 0.0045 2.093 0.463 0.018 
71 Gwinnett County, GA 757,104 0.0045 2.099 0.460 0.018 
72 San Francisco County, CA 744,041 0.0044 2.108 0.457 0.018 
73 El Paso County, TX 736,310 0.0043 2.113 0.455 0.017 
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i  County, State mi  mi M  hi  p(di )  p(α i )  
74 Essex County, MA 735,958 0.0043 2.114 0.455 0.017 
75 Monroe County, NY 730,807 0.0043 2.117 0.453 0.017 
76 DeKalb County, GA 723,602 0.0043 2.122 0.451 0.017 
77 Lake County, IL 713,076 0.0042 2.129 0.449 0.017 
78 San Mateo County, CA 705,499 0.0042 2.135 0.446 0.016 
79 Jefferson County, KY 701,500 0.0041 2.138 0.445 0.016 
80 Hidalgo County, TX 700,634 0.0041 2.138 0.445 0.016 
81 Collin County, TX 698,851 0.0041 2.140 0.445 0.016 
82 Oklahoma County, OK 691,266 0.0041 2.145 0.442 0.016 
83 Suffolk County, MA 687,610 0.0041 2.148 0.441 0.016 
84 Multnomah County, OR 681,454 0.0040 2.152 0.440 0.016 
85 Cobb County, GA 679,325 0.0040 2.154 0.439 0.016 
86 San Joaquin County, CA 673,170 0.0040 2.158 0.437 0.015 
87 Snohomish County, WA 669,887 0.0040 2.161 0.436 0.015 
88 Will County, IL 668,217 0.0039 2.162 0.436 0.015 
89 Jackson County, MO 664,078 0.0039 2.165 0.434 0.015 
90 Jefferson County, AL 656,700 0.0039 2.171 0.432 0.015 
91 Norfolk County, MA 654,753 0.0039 2.172 0.432 0.015 
92 Providence County, RI 635,596 0.0037 2.187 0.426 0.014 
93 Monmouth County, NJ 635,285 0.0037 2.187 0.426 0.014 
94 Baltimore city, MD 631,366 0.0037 2.190 0.425 0.014 
95 Bucks County, PA 623,205 0.0037 2.197 0.422 0.014 
96 Bernalillo County, NM 615,099 0.0036 2.203 0.419 0.014 
97 Hudson County, NJ 601,146 0.0035 2.215 0.415 0.013 
98 Kent County, MI 599,524 0.0035 2.216 0.414 0.013 
99 Denton County, TX 584,238 0.0034 2.229 0.409 0.013 
100 District of Columbia, DC 581,530 0.0034 2.231 0.409 0.013 
101 Davidson County, TN 578,698 0.0034 2.234 0.408 0.013 
102 Tulsa County, OK 577,795 0.0034 2.234 0.407 0.013 
103 El Paso County, CO 576,884 0.0034 2.235 0.407 0.013 
104 Lee County, FL 571,344 0.0034 2.240 0.405 0.013 
105 Denver County, CO 566,974 0.0033 2.244 0.404 0.012 
106 Ocean County, NJ 562,335 0.0033 2.248 0.402 0.012 
107 Polk County, FL 561,606 0.0033 2.249 0.402 0.012 
108 Delaware County, PA 555,996 0.0033 2.254 0.400 0.012 
109 Summit County, OH 545,931 0.0032 2.263 0.396 0.012 
110 Bristol County, MA 545,379 0.0032 2.263 0.396 0.012 
111 Montgomery County, OH 542,237 0.0032 2.266 0.395 0.012 
112 Arapahoe County, CO 537,197 0.0032 2.271 0.393 0.012 
113 Brevard County, FL 534,359 0.0032 2.273 0.392 0.012 
114 Union County, NJ 531,088 0.0031 2.276 0.391 0.011 
115 Jefferson County, CO 526,994 0.0031 2.280 0.390 0.011 
116 New Castle County, DE 525,587 0.0031 2.282 0.389 0.011 
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i  County, State mi  mi M  hi  p(di )  p(α i )  
117 Camden County, NJ 517,001 0.0030 2.290 0.386 0.011 
118 Johnson County, KS 516,731 0.0030 2.290 0.386 0.011 
119 Washington County, OR 514,269 0.0030 2.292 0.385 0.011 
120 Stanislaus County, CA 512,138 0.0030 2.294 0.384 0.011 
121 Anne Arundel County, MD 509,300 0.0030 2.297 0.383 0.011 
122 Passaic County, NJ 497,093 0.0029 2.309 0.379 0.010 
123 Volusia County, FL 496,575 0.0029 2.310 0.378 0.010 
124 Lancaster County, PA 494,486 0.0029 2.312 0.378 0.010 
125 Lake County, IN 494,202 0.0029 2.312 0.377 0.010 
126 Kane County, IL 493,735 0.0029 2.313 0.377 0.010 
127 Plymouth County, MA 493,623 0.0029 2.313 0.377 0.010 
128 Ramsey County, MN 493,215 0.0029 2.313 0.377 0.010 
129 Fort Bend County, TX 493,187 0.0029 2.313 0.377 0.010 
130 Morris County, NJ 493,160 0.0029 2.313 0.377 0.010 
131 Douglas County, NE 492,003 0.0029 2.314 0.377 0.010 
132 Chester County, PA 482,112 0.0028 2.325 0.373 0.010 
133 Richmond County, NY 477,377 0.0028 2.330 0.371 0.010 
134 Sedgwick County, KS 470,895 0.0028 2.336 0.368 0.010 
135 Sonoma County, CA 466,891 0.0028 2.341 0.367 0.010 
136 Utah County, UT 464,760 0.0027 2.343 0.366 0.010 
137 Dane County, WI 463,826 0.0027 2.344 0.365 0.010 
138 Hampden County, MA 460,520 0.0027 2.348 0.364 0.009 
139 Onondaga County, NY 456,777 0.0027 2.352 0.363 0.009 
140 Guilford County, NC 451,905 0.0027 2.357 0.361 0.009 
141 Burlington County, NJ 450,627 0.0027 2.358 0.360 0.009 
142 Pasco County, FL 450,171 0.0027 2.359 0.360 0.009 
143 Spokane County, WA 446,706 0.0026 2.363 0.358 0.009 
144 Lucas County, OH 445,281 0.0026 2.364 0.358 0.009 
145 Genesee County, MI 441,966 0.0026 2.368 0.356 0.009 
146 Virginia Beach city, VA 435,619 0.0026 2.376 0.354 0.009 
147 Jefferson Parish, LA 431,361 0.0025 2.380 0.352 0.009 
148 East Baton Rouge Parish, LA 429,073 0.0025 2.383 0.351 0.009 
149 Tulare County, CA 419,909 0.0025 2.394 0.347 0.008 
150 Greenville County, SC 417,166 0.0025 2.397 0.346 0.008 
151 York County, PA 416,322 0.0025 2.398 0.345 0.008 
152 Adams County, CO 414,338 0.0024 2.401 0.344 0.008 
153 Clark County, WA 412,938 0.0024 2.403 0.344 0.008 
154 Knox County, TN 411,967 0.0024 2.404 0.343 0.008 
155 Solano County, CA 411,680 0.0024 2.404 0.343 0.008 
156 Monterey County, CA 410,206 0.0024 2.406 0.342 0.008 
157 Polk County, IA 408,888 0.0024 2.407 0.342 0.008 
158 Seminole County, FL 406,875 0.0024 2.410 0.341 0.008 
159 Mobile County, AL 404,157 0.0024 2.413 0.340 0.008 
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i  County, State mi  mi M  hi  p(di )  p(α i )  
160 Hillsborough County, NH 402,789 0.0024 2.415 0.339 0.008 
161 Berks County, PA 401,149 0.0024 2.417 0.338 0.008 
162 Santa Barbara County, CA 400,335 0.0024 2.418 0.338 0.008 
163 Montgomery County, TX 398,290 0.0023 2.421 0.337 0.008 
164 Washoe County, NV 396,428 0.0023 2.423 0.336 0.008 
165 Dakota County, MN 388,001 0.0023 2.434 0.332 0.007 
166 Cameron County, TX 387,717 0.0023 2.434 0.332 0.007 
167 Waukesha County, WI 380,985 0.0022 2.443 0.329 0.007 
168 Stark County, OH 380,575 0.0022 2.444 0.329 0.007 
169 Orange County, NY 376,392 0.0022 2.449 0.327 0.007 
170 Clackamas County, OR 374,230 0.0022 2.452 0.326 0.007 
171 Sarasota County, FL 369,535 0.0022 2.459 0.323 0.007 
172 Mercer County, NJ 367,605 0.0022 2.461 0.322 0.007 
173 Pulaski County, AR 367,319 0.0022 2.462 0.322 0.007 
174 Westmoreland County, PA 366,440 0.0022 2.463 0.322 0.007 
175 Ada County, ID 359,035 0.0021 2.473 0.318 0.007 
176 Prince William County, VA 357,503 0.0021 2.475 0.317 0.007 
177 Butler County, OH 354,992 0.0021 2.479 0.316 0.007 
178 Williamson County, TX 353,830 0.0021 2.481 0.315 0.007 
179 Richland County, SC 348,226 0.0021 2.489 0.313 0.006 
180 Allen County, IN 347,316 0.0020 2.490 0.312 0.006 
181 St. Louis city, MO 347,181 0.0020 2.490 0.312 0.006 
182 Washtenaw County, MI 344,047 0.0020 2.495 0.310 0.006 
183 St. Charles County, MO 338,719 0.0020 2.503 0.308 0.006 
184 Lane County, OR 337,870 0.0020 2.504 0.307 0.006 
185 Lehigh County, PA 335,544 0.0020 2.507 0.306 0.006 
186 Forsyth County, NC 332,355 0.0020 2.512 0.304 0.006 
187 Charleston County, SC 331,917 0.0020 2.513 0.304 0.006 
188 Anoka County, MN 327,005 0.0019 2.520 0.301 0.006 
189 Placer County, CA 326,242 0.0019 2.521 0.301 0.006 
190 Somerset County, NJ 324,186 0.0019 2.524 0.300 0.006 
191 Nueces County, TX 321,457 0.0019 2.529 0.299 0.006 
192 Marion County, FL 316,183 0.0019 2.537 0.296 0.006 
193 Collier County, FL 314,649 0.0019 2.539 0.295 0.006 
194 Manatee County, FL 313,298 0.0018 2.542 0.294 0.006 
195 Luzerne County, PA 313,020 0.0018 2.542 0.294 0.006 
196 Hamilton County, TN 312,905 0.0018 2.542 0.294 0.006 
197 McHenry County, IL 312,373 0.0018 2.543 0.294 0.005 
198 Marion County, OR 311,304 0.0018 2.545 0.293 0.005 
199 Madison County, AL 304,307 0.0018 2.556 0.289 0.005 
200 Lorain County, OH 301,993 0.0018 2.560 0.288 0.005 
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APPENDIX D. SELECTED EXCEL RESULTS FOR STOPT3141 
Terms: mi, Population in county i; mi/M, county share mi of total population M; hi, 
threshold level set in county i; p(di), probability of detection in county i; p(α i ) , 
probability of detection in county i. 
Based on an  Xi ~ N (0,1)  in-control distribution and a 2σ  shift in the mean incidence 
level. Overall Pd = 0.515, E(false alarms) = 4. 
 
i  County, State mi  mi M  hi  p(di ) p(α i )  
1 Los Angeles County, CA 9,948,081 0.0587 0.452 0.939 0.326 
2 Cook County, IL 5,288,655 0.0312 0.884 0.868 0.188 
3 Harris County, TX 3,886,207 0.0130 1.094 0.817 0.137 
4 Maricopa County, AZ 3,768,123 0.0126 1.115 0.812 0.132 
5 Orange County, CA 3,002,048 0.0100 1.271 0.767 0.102 
6 San Diego County, CA 2,941,454 0.0098 1.285 0.763 0.099 
7 Kings County, NY 2,508,820 0.0084 1.394 0.728 0.082 
8 Miami-Dade County, FL 2,402,208 0.0080 1.423 0.718 0.077 
9 Dallas County, TX 2,345,815 0.0078 1.440 0.712 0.075 
10 Queens County, NY 2,255,175 0.0075 1.466 0.703 0.071 
11 Riverside County, CA 2,026,803 0.0068 1.540 0.677 0.062 
12 San Bernardino County, CA 1,999,332 0.0067 1.549 0.674 0.061 
13 Wayne County, MI 1,971,853 0.0066 1.558 0.671 0.060 
14 King County, WA 1,826,732 0.0061 1.611 0.652 0.054 
15 Broward County, FL 1,787,636 0.0060 1.625 0.646 0.052 
16 Clark County, NV 1,777,539 0.0059 1.629 0.645 0.052 
17 Santa Clara County, CA 1,731,281 0.0058 1.647 0.638 0.050 
18 Tarrant County, TX 1,671,295 0.0056 1.671 0.629 0.047 
19 New York County, NY 1,611,581 0.0054 1.696 0.619 0.045 
20 Bexar County, TX 1,555,592 0.0052 1.720 0.610 0.043 
21 Suffolk County, NY 1,469,715 0.0049 1.759 0.595 0.039 
22 Middlesex County, MA 1,467,016 0.0049 1.761 0.595 0.039 
23 Alameda County, CA 1,457,426 0.0049 1.765 0.593 0.039 
24 Philadelphia County, PA 1,448,394 0.0048 1.769 0.591 0.038 
25 Sacramento County, CA 1,374,724 0.0046 1.805 0.577 0.036 
26 Bronx County, NY 1,361,473 0.0045 1.812 0.575 0.035 
27 Nassau County, NY 1,325,662 0.0044 1.830 0.568 0.034 
28 Cuyahoga County, OH 1,314,241 0.0044 1.836 0.565 0.033 
29 Palm Beach County, FL 1,274,013 0.0043 1.857 0.557 0.032 
30 Allegheny County, PA 1,223,411 0.0041 1.885 0.546 0.030 
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i  County, State mi  mi M  hi  p(di ) p(α i )  
31 Oakland County, MI 1,214,255 0.0041 1.890 0.544 0.029 
32 Hillsborough County, FL 1,157,738 0.0039 1.922 0.531 0.027 
33 Hennepin County, MN 1,122,093 0.0037 1.944 0.522 0.026 
34 Franklin County, OH 1,095,662 0.0037 1.960 0.516 0.025 
35 Orange County, FL 1,043,500 0.0035 1.993 0.503 0.023 
36 Contra Costa County, CA 1,024,319 0.0034 2.006 0.498 0.022 
37 Fairfax County, VA 1,010,443 0.0034 2.015 0.494 0.022 
38 St. Louis County, MO 1,000,510 0.0033 2.022 0.491 0.022 
39 Salt Lake County, UT 978,701 0.0033 2.037 0.485 0.021 
40 Fulton County, GA 960,009 0.0032 2.050 0.480 0.020 
          ••••••       
55 Marion County, IN 865,504 0.0029 2.121 0.452 0.017 
77 Lake County, IL 713,076 0.0024 2.254 0.400 0.012 
99 Denton County, TX 584,238 0.0020 2.390 0.348 0.008 
105 Denver County, CO 566,974 0.0019 2.411 0.341 0.008 
132 Chester County, PA 482,112 0.0016 2.521 0.301 0.006 
165 Dakota County, MN 388,001 0.0013 2.670 0.251 0.004 
185 Lehigh County, PA 335,544 0.0011 2.769 0.221 0.003 
200 Lorain County, OH 301,993 0.0010 2.841 0.200 0.002 
270 Alachua County, FL 227,120 0.0008 3.036 0.150 0.001 
368 Brazos County, TX 159,006 0.0005 3.280 0.100 0.001 
592 Cabell County, WV 93,904 0.0003 3.640 0.050 0.000 
1325 Jackson County, OH 33,543 0.0001 4.344 0.010 0.000 
2209 Amite County, MS 13,466 0.0000 4.968 0.001 0.000 
2568 Conejos County, CO 8,406 0.0000 5.290 0.001 0.000 
2569 Woods County, OK 8,385 0.0000 5.292 0.000 0.000 
2800 Cameron County, PA 5,489 0.0000 5.582 0.000 0.000 
3000 Graham County, KS 2,677 0.0000 6.073 0.000 0.000 
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